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THE INTRODUCTION OF EUROPEAN UNION COMPETITION LAW AND
POLICY IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES
Andre Fiebigt
Introduction
The competition policy negotiations with the Eastern European candidate
countries have been at times arduous but remarkably expedient. The accession
negotiations with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and
Slovenia were formally opened after the Luxembourg Council meeting in
December of 1997. These countries are sometimes referred to as the
"Luxembourg Group." The other group of accession candidates, the "Helsinki
Group," is comprised of Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and
Slovakia. In order to facilitate the rapid advancement of negotiations, the
negotiations were divided into thirty-one policy areas or "chapters."
Negotiations with the Luxembourg Group over the competition "chapter" began
in 1998 and with the Helsinki Group in 2000.' Negotiations were closed earlier
this year with a target date of May 1, 2004 for accession. It is quite remarkable
how much has been accomplished in such a short time, particularly when one
considers that the European Union ("EU") negotiated the concerns of each of the
candidate countries individually.2 The introduction of competition law and
policy in the candidate countries is characterized by a panoply of political,
sociological and legal challenges. My presentation will attempt to identify the
challenges that the EU has faced in the process leading up to the accession of the
candidate countries and the challenges that an expanded EU will likely face in
the near and long-term future. I will conclude my presentation with a few
predictions on the future of competition law in the European Union comprised of
twenty-five member states.
General Challenges
According to one of the Copenhagen criteria, membership in the EU requires
t Andre Fiebig, Partner, Gardner Carton & Douglas, Chicago, Illinois
Enlargement: Negotiations of the Chapter 6 Competition Policy, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
enlargement/negotiations/chapters/chap6/index.htm (Dec. 2000) (Negotiations with Bulgaria on
the competition chapter began in 2001).
2 The Commission refers to this approach as the strategy of differentiation. Youri Devuyst, EU
Enlargement and Competition Policy: Where Are We Now?, 2002 EC COMPETITION POLICY
NEWSLETTER (Competition Directorate-Generale of the European Commission, Brussels,
Belgium), Feb. 2002, at 3.
International Law ReviewVolume , Issue I
European Union Competition Law and Policy
adoption by the candidate countries of the EU's acquis communautaire.3
Moreover, as a prerequisite for closing the negotiations over the competition
chapter, the EU required the candidate countries to maintain laws applicable to
competition and state aid, adequate administration to enforce those laws and a
credible enforcement record in the area of competition law.4 For the accession
countries, this may be characterized as representing a fundamental shift to
greater reliance on the market for organization of the economy and the
distribution of wealth. Adherence to the free movement principles means that
member states must remove state-imposed obstacles to trade. The introduction of
the competition rules means that private obstacles to trade are prohibited. In
other words, membership in the EU means acceptance not only of the acquis
communautaire, but also of the "economic constitution ' 5 of the EU, which itself
is based on notions of liberal democracy.
It is important to recognize that the candidate countries will be starting at a
point that is different from that of the existing member states at the time of their
accession. Most of the existing fifteen member states already were familiar with
rules regulating competition prior to their entry into the European Community.
Although the Europe Agreements with the accession countries already provided
for mirror competition law, the experience in applying these rules has been
limited.6 Moreover, the "ramp-up" period for the new member states will be
much shorter than that of the founding member states. Although the competition
rules were part of the initial Treaty Establishing the European Community ("EC
Treaty") signed in 1957,7 their enforcement was not really possible until the
adoption of Regulation 17 in 1962.8 Even then, the competition rules codified in
the EC Treaty were not immediately enforced. Their application was as flexible
as needed in order to achieve the desired integration at the desired speed.9 Now,
3 Copenhagen European Council, Presidency Conclusions, E.C. Bull., no. 6, at 7 (1993).
4 See Youri Devuyst, supra note 2.
5 See Barry J. Rodger, Competition Policy, Liberalism and Globalization: A European
Perspective, COLUM J. EUR. L. 289 (2000); P. Behrens, Die Wirtschaftsverfassung der
Europdischen Gemeinschaft, in: BROGGEMEIER, G. (ed.), 73-90 (Verfassungen fir ein Ziviles
Europa) (1994).
6 See Milan Banas, The New Anti-Monopoly Law in Slovakia, 16 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV.
16(7), 441-445 (1995); Mark A. Dutz and Maria Vagliasindi, Competition Policy Implementation
in Transition Economies: An Empirical Assessment, 44 EUR. ECON. REV. 762 (2000); Bernard
Hoekman and Simeon Djankov, Competition Law in Post-Central-Planning Bulgaria, ANTITRUST
BULLETIN 227 (2000); Ales Musil, Protection of Economic Competition in the Czech Republic, 17
EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 1996, 17(8), 476479; T6th, Tiham6r, Competition Law in Hungary:
Harmonisation Towards E. U. Membership, 19 EuR. COMPETITION LAW REV. 1998, 19(6), 358-369;
Virtanen, Dalia, The New Competition Act in Lithuania, 18 EUR. COMPETITION LAW REV. 2000,
21(1), 30-36.
7 CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, (March
25, 1957), O.J. (C325) 13, at www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/ec cons-treaty-en.pdf.
8 Council Regulation No. 17: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty,
(1962). 87 O.J. SPEC. ED., at http://europa.eu.int.
9 DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE: PROTECTING
International Law Review Volume , Issue I
European Union Competition Law and Policy
however, the new member states will be assimilated into a system that has been
in existence for several decades. Its flexibility will be limited by case law in
existence and stated European Commission policy.
The introduction of competition law into the new member states has an aura
of antitrust imperialism for many people. Professionals, in particular lawyers, are
often captured by their training and the context in which they practice their
profession. The application of the law to achieve fair results is not always
appropriate in different societies. For example, an interpretation of what
constitutes anti-competitive behavior may legitimately vary between societies;
an aspect often overlooked by antitrust regulators, practitioners and economists.
Moreover, antitrust lawyers are particularly vulnerable to making this mistake
because many believe that the application of competition rules is based on
objective economic principles. And, after all, economics is sometimes
considered a science that can be supported by empirical evidence. As the history
of antitrust law shows, there are very few objective rules of antitrust law that do
not change over time.10 As Professor Waller correctly observes, "Antitrust, like
all law, is not universal, but specific to a time, place, and culture.'
The popularity of the term "competition culture" is a manifestation of the
antitrust imperialism to which I refer. Officials in both the EU and the United
States have used the term "competition culture" without precise definition. 12 The
basic message is that the new member states need to adopt the EU and US
understanding of competition in order for these states to join the developed
world. This position not only ignores the possibility that the objectives of
competition policy may be achieved by other means, but also the fact that neither
the US, nor the EU, can claim to be entirely right when it comes to competition
law. No jurisdiction in the world gives absolute deference to the protection of
competition. There are always situations in which democratic societies, through
their legislatures, decide that competition should not be the governing
principle.13 The question then becomes not whether a state protects competition,
but rather how much competition to allow. In Germany, for example, the
German Minister of Economics recently granted approval to a merger that the
Bundeskartellamt had prohibited because of its negative effect on competition in
PROMETHEUS (1998); Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, The Contribution of EC Competition Policy to the
Single Market, 29 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 257 (1992).
10 See Thomas J. Di Lorenzo & Jack C. High, Antitrust and Competition, Historically
Considered, 26 ECON. INQUIRY 423 (1988); RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN
AMERICA 1888-1992 (1996).
" Spencer Weber Waller, Comparative Competition Law as a Form of Empiricism, 25 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 455, 463 (1997-1998).
12 Speech by Mario Monte, Enforcement of Competition Policy-Case for Accession Negotiations
and for Developing a Real Competition Culture Speech/01/294 (2001), available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?reslist.
13 See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern ofAntitrust: the
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 150-51 (1982) (citing United States as
an example of such a democratic society).
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Germany. 14 The decision was based on the nebulous concept of "public interest"
rather than on a concern for preserving competition.
In addition to recognizing the absence of an objective model of antitrust, one
needs to recognize the inherent vagueness of the term "competition." The
dynamic character of the concept of competition means that identifying its
restraint is relative.15 The candidate countries will struggle with this. Reliance
upon the methodology currently applied in the EU provides only minor relief
because of the different stages of economic development of the candidate
countries.' 6 Moreover, the accession of the ten new member states means an
increase of official languages from eleven to twenty-two. 17
Finally, the introduction of competition law in the new member states will
confront different social norms and expectations. The role of the state in
economic activity, both as a participant and as a protector, differs between
societies. Accession will require at least partial conformity to the western
European understanding of the role of the state in V rotecting competition. This
adjustment is a challenge to the integration process.
Specific Challenges
Now that I have identified several of the abstract challenges associated with
the introduction of competition law in the candidate countries, I have fulfilled
my academic obligations. As I am a legal practitioner, I would like to move
away from the abstract and towards the concrete. In my view, the primary
challenge of introducing competition law in the candidate countries will be to
address the market dominance of privatized entities. The economies of the new
member states are characterized by large state-owned enterprises. The
14 E.ON/Ruhrgas, Verfiigung vom 5. Juli 2002, 52 WIRTSCHAFT UND WETTBEWERB 751 (2002);
See W. Moschel, Neue Rechtsfragen bei der Ministererlaubnis in der Fusionskontrolle, 2002
Betriebs-Berater 2077.
15 Erich Hoppmann, Zum Problem einer Wirtschaftspolitisch Praktikablen Definition des
Wettbewerbs, in: GRUNDLAGEN DER WETTBEWERBSPOLITIK (1968). Moreover, sociolinguistics
illustrate that even the same term often is society-dependent.
16 James Langenfeld & Marsha Blitzer, 1, Competition Policy the Last Thing Central and
Eastern Europe Need?, 6 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 347 (1991); A.E. Rodriguez & Mark
Williams, The Effectiveness of Proposed Antitrust Programs for Developing Counties, 19 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 209 (1994).
7 For a discussion of the myriad of issues raised by the use of a large number of different
languages within one legal system see S. Moratinos Johnston, Multilingualism and EU
Enlargement, 2000 Terminologie et Traduction 5; Gerd Toscani, Translation and Law - The
Multilingual Context of the European Union Institutions, 30 INT'L J. LEGAL INFORMATION 288
(2002); R. Baerts, Law and Language in the European Union, 1997 EC TAX LAW 49; D. Martiny,
Babylon in Briissel? Das Recht und die europaische Sprachenvielfalt, 1998 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
EUROPAISCHES PRIVATRECHT 227.
is William Kovacic, Getting Started. Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in Transition
Economies, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 455 (1997). Anne Forualczyk, Competition Policy During
Transformation of a Centrally Planned Economy, 1992 FORDHAM CORP. L. 131 (1993).
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introduction of competition law will mean the liberalization of these sectors of
the economy. The process of transforming an enterprise from state ownership to
private ownership is only half the battle. At least initially, the newly privatized
firms will likely enjoy a dominant position in the sector of the economy in which
they operate. As the European Commission can verify, the competition
"policing" of such firms is often difficult and fraught by political barriers. Many
of the formerly state-owned enterprises in the EU have attempted to employ
different mechanisms by which to maintain their dominance. 19 The competition
authorities in new member states will have a similar challenge except that they
lack the stature in their countries that many competition authorities in the old
member states enjoy.
In addition to the dominance of newly privatized companies, the competition
authorities in the new member states will encounter industries to which the old
member states have granted exclusive rights. Here again, this challenge is not
foreign to the EU. The EU Community has struggled for years to draw a line
between those industries that should be exposed to competition and those
industries operating for the public good that should be shielded from
competition. Article 86 of the EC Treaty prevents the member states from
maintaining measures which facilitate violations of the competition rules by
public undertakings to which the member states have granted exclusive rights.
As illustrated by Cali e Figli, if a private undertaking has been granted the
responsibility to fulfill public functions, then the competition rules do not
apply.
20
Predictions
I would like to conclude by offering some predictions for the near future.
Allow me to begin by simply making the observation that, from an
administrative perspective, the introduction of European competition law into
the new member states could not have come at a worse time. The European
Commission is currently in the process of "modernization" of its competition
rules. 2' One legislative instrument that forms the basis of the modernization will
coincidentally come into force on the same day as the accession of the new
member states.22 Because the modernization process involves fundamental
9 See e.g. Commission of Dec. 5, 2002, Decision Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 82 of
the EC Treaty, 2002 O.J. (L 61) 32; Commission Decision of Mar. 20, 2001, Relating to a
Proceeding Under Article 82 of the EC Treaty 2001 O.J. (L 125) 27.
20 Cali e Figli, Case C-343/95, 1997 E.C.R. 1-1547; see also Fluggesellschaft v. Eurocontrol,
Case C-364/92, 1994 E.C.R. 1-43.
21 Damien Geradin, Competition Between Rules and Rules of Competition: A Legal and
Economic Analysis of the Proposed Modernization of the Enforcement of EC Competition Law, 9
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1, 1 (2002); Wouter P.J. Wils, The Modernization of the Enforcement of
Articles 81 and 82 EC: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the Commission's Proposal for a New
Council Regulation Replacing Regulation No. 17, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1655 (2001).
22 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1, at
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changes to the substantive and procedural rules, legal uncertainty is an inevitable
consequence of the modernization process. For example, it remains to be seen
how the increased application of the European competition rules by the member
states will play out. The European Commission will have enough difficulty
ensuring consistent results between fifteen different competition authorities let
alone twenty-five.
This legal uncertainty, which is the Achilles heel of businesses, will be
exacerbated-and indeed has been exacerbated-by the lack of a consensus over
an appropriate economic model. The application of competition law is guided
primarily by economics.23 In recognition of this fact, the European Commission
recently announced the creation of a new position of Chief Economist within the
Competition Directorate, with the staff necessary to provide both an independent
economic viewpoint to decision-makers at all levels and to provide guidance
throughout the investigation process. 24 However, there is no consensus within
Europe, and certainly not the world, over the appropriate economic model and
the role of non-economic concerns in the application of competition law.25
26Economic efficiency, the perceived purpose of US antitrust law, is not the
exclusive goal of EU competition law.
The current US antitrust jurisprudence tends to rely heavily on the concept of
efficiency in determining which conduct should be prohibited. European
competition law is situated in a much different legal, economic and social
context. Although the EC Treaty importantly proclaims the protection of
competition as one of its fundamental goals, 27 it is only one of many goals that
share the same legal status. For example, the EC Treaty specifically provides
http://europa.eu.int/abc/treatiesen.htm.
23 See e.g. Di Lorenzo & High, supra note 10.
24 Commission Press Release, Commission Reorganizes its Competition Department in
Advancement of Enlargement, IP/03/603 (30 April 2003), at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/startcgi/
guesten.ksh?reslist; see also Speech by Mario Monti, Competition Enforcement Reforms in the EU
: Some Comments by the Reformer, Georgetown University Washington, Apr. 4, 2003
Speech/03/200 at http://europe.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?reslist.
25 Eleanor Fox, What is Harm to Competition? Antitrust, Exclusionary Practices and the Elusive
Notion of Anticompetitive Effect, in THE FUTURE OF TRANSNATIONAL ANTITRUST - FROM
COMPARATIVE TO COMMON COMPETITION LAW (Josef Drexl ed., 2003).
26 Daniel R. Ernst, The New Antitrust History, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 879 (1990) (explaining
that in the US there has been significant debate over the goals of antitrust, and that, although it is
difficult to identify a specific goal intended by the drafters of the legislation, the current consensus
is that the antitrust laws are designed for the "protection of competition, not competitors"), see, e.g.
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977); Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. U.S.A Petroleum
Co.,495 U.S. 328 (1990); Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Intern., 256 F.3d 799
(2001); Continental Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 2002); see also
Lawrence H. Summers, Competition Policy in the New Economy, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 353, 358
(2001) (stating that in the U.S. legal, economic and social system, competition is worthy of
protection because it is used as a tool to allocate resources efficiently: "The goal is efficiency, not
competition").
27 EC TREATY art. 3(1)(g).
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that "(e)nvironmental protection requirements must be integrated into the
definition and implementation of the Community policies ... ,28 It is not
surprising, therefore, to see non-economic considerations influencing the
application of the competition rules.29 Although this is not a critical assessment,
one must concede that the potential for non-competition factors to influence the
application of the competition rules will result in very different results in the ten
new member states.
30
The German Book Publishers case provides a cogent example of how
competition law interacts with other social concerns in Europe. In contrast to the
US, the protection or promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity is recognized
by the European Commission as having an influence on the application of
competition law. In Germany, book publishers have adopted a system
("Sammelrevers") to allow the publishers to fix the resale price of books. As
long as retail book buying was primarily a local activity, this system did not
draw the attention of the European Commission, and it was expressly exempted
under German competition law.31 The basic rationale behind allowing such
activity was to preserve cultural heritage.32 Once the Internet made the purchase
of books easier, the issue arose whether the system infringed Article 81 (1) of the
EC Treaty. After the book publishers' association agreed not to fix the resale
price of books for sale outside Germany, the European Commission took the
position that there was no effect on trade between member states and hence no
infringement of Article 81 of the EC Treaty.33 As is generally recognized,34 this
case illustrated the readiness of the European Commission to take into account
national claims of cultural and linguistic diversity. It is not necessarily consistent
with the European Commission's otherwise broad interpretation of the interstate
trade requirement.
The situation is not helped by the inadequate guidance from European courts.
In the field of competition law, European courts have traditionally deferred to
the discretion of the European Commission.35 The qualification of vertical
agreements establishing absolute territorial protection is but one example. For
28 EC TREATY aet. 6 EC.
29 See e.g. DSD, Griiner Punkt, 1997 O.J. (C 100) 4; Eco-Emballages, 2001 O.J. (L 233) 45.
30 The Commission is aware of this potential and has consequently established a network
comprised of the competition authorities of the member states. The main objective of this network
is to coordinate the application of the European competition rules by the individual member states.
31 §15 GWB.
32 BGH, GRUR 1979, 490ff.
33 IP/02/461.
34 Hanns Peter Nehl & Jan Nuijten, Commission Ends Competition Proceedings regarding
German Book Price Fixing, 2002 (2) COMPETITION POLICY NEWSLETTER 35 (2002).
35 See e.g. Case T-342/00, Petrolessence SA v. Commission, 2003 E.C.R. 11-67. Only in the last
several years have the Community courts started to devote greater scrutiny to the conclusions of
the Commission.
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many years, the European Commission and European courts have treated
absolute territorial protection as a "hardcore" restraint that could not even
qualify for an exemption under Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty.36 However, in
Royal Philips Electronics NV v. Commission, the Court of First Instance stated
that "even an agreement imposing absolute territorial protection may escape the
prohibition contained in Article 81(1) if it affects the market only
significantly. '
37
Another example of the lack of guidance from the European courts is Wouters
v. Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten.38 For many years, the European
Commission has equated a restraint of competition in the context of Article
81(1) of the EC Treaty with a limitation of the commercial freedom of a market
actor.39 Even the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") has confirmed this
interpretation.40 This approach was attractive, particularly in view of the open-
ended rule of reason approach applied by US courts, because it facilitated easy
application of the norm and avoided the necessity to engage in complicated
economic analysis of the particular practice. Recently, however, the ECJ seemed
to suggest that this is no longer the standard. The issue in Wouters was whether
Dutch rules of professional responsibility for lawyers, which prevented lawyers
from practicing in partnership with accountants, violated Article 81 (1) of the EC
Treaty. After recognizing that the prohibition is "liable to limit production and
technical development within the meaning of Article 81(l)(b) of the Treaty,",
41
the Court stated that "not every agreement between undertakings or every
decision of an association of undertakings which restricts the freedom of action
of the parties or of one of them necessarily falls within the prohibition laid down
in Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty., 42 The Court of First Instance concluded that
the restriction was somehow a justified restriction and did not infringe Article
81(1).
The expansion of the EU to the new member states will result in increased
forum shopping, possibly involving the new member states. As discussed earlier,
one consequence of the European Commission's modernization program is the
devolution of responsibility for applying the European competition rules from
the European Commission to the member states. In instances where the
competition rules provide for ex ante clearance of business practices, there will
be an incentive for businesses to find the most lenient competition authority with
36 DeMinimis Notice, O.J. 2001 (C 368) 13.
37 Case T-1 19/02, Royal Philips Electronics NV v. Commission, 2003 E.C.R. 1218.
38 Case C-309/99 Wouters v. Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, 2002 E.C.R. 1-1577.
39 BP/Kellogg, O.J. 1985 (L 369) 6 15; UIP, O.1. 1989 (L 226) 40; Commission, 23rd Report
on Competition Policy (1994) 160.
40 Case 107/82, AEG v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 3151, 3201 160.
41 Wouters at 190.
42 Wouters at 197.
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jurisdiction from which to secure that clearance.
The final consequence of the enlargement process that I would like to predict
is greater politicization of the application of the competition laws. As discussed
above, the legal and social context of competition rules and the limited nature of
economics as a prediction of human behavior make the application of
competition laws vulnerable to political influence. Once one recognizes that
economic principles are not the only source of guidance in applying the
competition rules, 43 it becomes difficult to determine whether a particular
decision applying the legal norm is correct. Moreover, the public in the new
member states will put pressure on its politicians to apply the competition laws
in a particular way so as to achieve results that may not have otherwise resulted
from the application of the competition rules. This, however, may be an
inevitable characteristic of any competition law regime in a democratic
context.44 Greater reliance on the market for organization of the economy and the
distribution of wealth results in economic discontent. As accession will expose
industry in the accession countries to increased competition, it will result in
economic difficulties for those less competitive sectors of the economy. The
ensuing loss of employment will be a difficult pill to swallow.
Conclusion
This presentation has focused on the competition law aspects of EU
enlargement. There will no doubt be difficulties in the integration from a
competition law perspective. Taken as a whole, however, accession will prove to
be beneficial for the new and the old member states as it reduces the barriers to
trade between these areas. Most of the predicted problems identified above will
be short-term difficulties, which will no doubt be overcome. Many of the
challenges are not new to the European Commission. There are a large number
of European officials who experienced the assimilation of East Germany into the
Community. Almost overnight, European competition law was applicable in the
East.45 This experience will no doubt prove useful in the assimilation of the
candidate countries in the next several years.46
43 Schwartz, Justice and other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1076
(1979).
44 See generally Roger Faith, Donald Leavens & Robert Tollison, Antitrust Pork Barrel, 25 J.L.
& ECON. 329 (1982).
45 Andre Fiebig, The German Federal Cartel Office and the Application of Competition Law in
Reunified Germany, 14 U. PENN. J. INT'L. Bus. L. 373 (1993).
46 See Speech by Mario Monti on 27 Sept. 2001 to the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
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